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Abstract
We consider an economy with two language groups, where only agents
who share a language can produce together. Schooling enhances the pro-
ductivity of students. Individuals attending a unilingual school end up
speaking the language of instruction only, while bilingual schools render
individuals bilingual at the same cost. The politically dominant group
(not necessarily the majority) chooses the type(s) of schools accessible to
each language group, and then individuals decide whether to attend school.
We show that the dominant either choose laissez-faire or restrict access to
schools in the language of the dominated. Instead, the dominated favour
the use of their own language. Thus, while agents do not derive util-
ity from speaking their mother tongue, language conflicts of the expected
type endogenously arise. Democracy (majority rule) always leads to the
implementation of a socially optimal education system, while restrictions
to the use of the language of the dominated are implemented too often
under minority rule. The model is consistent with evidence from Belgium,
France, and Finland.
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1 Introduction
In 2000, half of the world’s countries had at least one language minority consti-
tuting more than 10% of their population. This language diversity has recently
brought language policies to the forefront of political debate in such countries
as Malaysia, the ex-Soviet States, Spain, Belgium, and the United States. As
stressed by sociolinguists, one crucial component behind language shifts across
generations is the choice of the language(s) of instruction in school. For ex-
ample, Fishman (1977, p. 116) argues that “for language spread, schools have
long been the major formal (organized) mechanisms involved.” In other words,
languages that are not given the status of medium of instruction in school tend
to be replaced by languages that are.
The cases of France and Finland provide two illustrations of the importance
of language policies for language development. In the late 18th century, about
60% of those living in France did not actually speak French (Grégoire 1794).
Nowadays, nearly everybody there speaks French, and other languages are spo-
ken by only 5% of the population (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2003). Instru-
mental in this development was the implementation of a unilingual education
system from the 1880s, that established French as the sole language of instruc-
tion in school. At the other end of the spectrum, the bilingual Finnish—Swedish
education system, implemented upon Finland’s independence in 1917, has been
one of the factors explaining the relatively good shape of Swedish in contempo-
rary Finland, with the number of native Swedish speakers roughly unchanged
since 1920.1
Given the importance of language of instruction, we set up a model to ex-
plain why some multilingual countries choose unilingual education while others
maintain language diversity. We consider an economy with two language groups
whose members are initially unable to communicate. Value is generated from
bilateral production after schooling among agents speaking the same language.
Schooling is a “bundle” because it enhances the productivity (or earnings) of
students and can also modify their language endowment.2 Schools can be bilin-
gual or unilingual in either language. Individuals attending a unilingual school
end up speaking the language of instruction only, whereas bilingual schools
make individuals bilingual at the same cost. Thus, bilingual schools have a
technological advantage over unilingual schools.
The politically “dominant” language group (not necessarily the majority)
decides first the type(s) of schools accessible to each language group (the “edu-
cation system”), and then individuals choose whether or not to attend school.
The interaction among individual school attendance decisions is generated by
the network externalities arising from the requirement that production partners
1 In 1920 there were 314,000 native Swedish speakers (McRae 1997) and in 2000 there were
293,000 (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2003). In relative terms, the number of Swedish speakers
has declined from 11% to 5.9% of the total Finnish population.
2The positive effect of education on earnings is a well-established fact in the literature (see
e.g. Card 1999), and language of instruction in school is an important factor behind language
shift (see e.g. Fishman 1977 or Hagège 1996). The bundling assumption implies that we
assume away the possibility that individuals go to schools that exclusively provide language
training. This is because we are interested here in the choice of the language of instruction
and not in language training in general.
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speak a common language.
Although the number of potential education systems is large, we show that
no system yields a higher utility to the dominant group than laissez-faire (free
choice of school) or one of the following two systems that restrict the use of the
language of the dominated group: (i) a unilingual system where only the mother
tongue of the dominant group is allowed in education; and (ii) an (asymmetric)
bilingual system, with bilingual schools for the dominated group and unilingual
schools in their own mother tongue for the dominant group.
Under laissez-faire, each individual undertaking education chooses to at-
tend a bilingual school, which opens up for more production possibilities than
unilingual schools at no additional cost. The attractiveness of laissez-faire to
the dominant group then simply stems from the exclusive use of the superior
schooling technology. However, the dominant may prefer restricting the use of
the language of the dominated in order to foster the schooling incentives of the
dominated and to have them carry the cost of intergroup communication. Un-
der asymmetric bilingualism, schooling incentives for the dominated are higher
than under laissez-faire because the dominant legally restrict themselves from
learning the language of the dominated. Then, in contrast to laissez-faire (where
the dominant could become bilingual), the dominated here always gain produc-
tion partners when attending school. Under unilingualism, these incentives can
be even stronger because an uneducated member of the dominated group loses
the ability to communicate with the members of her own group who undertake
education (a “bandwagon” effect).
All political tension arising in equilibrium is of the expected type–namely,
situations in which the dominant want to restrict the use of the language of the
dominated while the dominated prefer a system in which their native language
is also a language of instruction. This is an interesting result in that it does
not rely on any direct utility enjoyed by the agents from speaking their own
native language. The dominated want their language to be used in schools not
because they “like it” but rather because abandoning it would systematically
force them to carry the cost of intergroup communication.
We determine the socially optimal education system. When a benevolent
planner can choose the education level of each individual, laissez-faire is always
optimal owing to the technological superiority of bilingual schools. If the central
planner can choose the education system but choice of school attendance re-
mains in the hands of the individuals, then laissez-faire is no longer necessarily
optimal, since bilingualism or unilingualism may be more effective at inducing
higher education levels in equilibrium.
Next we address the issue of failure in political decision making, that is,
we analyse the circumstances, if any, under which the political decision process
leads to adoption of the “wrong” education system. From a welfare viewpoint,
cost-efficient communication implies that the minority learn the majority lan-
guage, while no system yields a higher utility to the dominant than laissez-faire
or a restriction to the use of the language of the dominated. Because the dom-
inant group and the majority are the same under majority rule (democracy),
this system is shown always to lead to the adoption of a socially optimal de-
centralised system. If instead the dominant group is a minority (autocracy),
then restrictions to the use of the dominated group language are too often
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implemented.
The basic model is then extended to consider education subsidies, mother
tongue persistence in unilingual schools, cross-border spillovers, and a higher
cost of bilingual schools.
Empirically, our model predicts that the size of the language majority may
not be the most relevant factor for understanding the choice of education sys-
tem. Using regional data for 1860s France, we show that the proportion of
French-speaking schools is unrelated to the proportion of local French speak-
ers. In addition, the implementation of French unilingualism in 19th-century
Belgium is consistent with an elite-driven choice in our model, and the open
economy version of our model predicts the unanimous choice of bilingual schools
in 1920s Finland.
Our model is related to the growing literature on language adoption and in
particular to Lazear (1999), Church and King (1993), and John and Yi (2001).3
As in these three papers, agents in our model choose whether to make a costly
investment in learning a language that can be used in trade or production with
other agents. However, we differ from these papers by considering an investment
decision that ties skill acquisition and language acquisition. In Lazear (1999),
agents behave competitively, but in our model–just as in Church and King
(1993) and John and Yi (2001)–the investment decision is strategic and the
equilibrium outcome depends on a network externality.4 Our paper differs from
the two latter works in that we endogeneise the type of network externalities
under consideration, since it depends on the choice of education system. Another
difference is that our explanation of language shift is based on the choice of
schooling institutions, whereas John and Yi (2001) provides an explanation
based on geography and on intergenerational language transmission. Finally,
a further contribution of our model is the derivation of language conflict or
consensus as an equilibrium outcome.
2 The model
Consider a country inhabited by a continuum of individuals, normalised to
unity. There are two language groups in the country, L = {M,N}, of respective
sizes pl = {pm, pn}. We also denote by −L the language group other than L.
Political power is in the hands of language group M whether or not pm ≥
1/2. For this reason, the Ms are also referred to throughout the paper as the
“dominant” group and the Ns as the “dominated” group.5 Initially, the Ms
3There are, of course, other papers studying language. Lang (1986) proposes a language
theory of discrimination. Pool (1991) and Laitin (1994) analyse the choice of an official
language in multilingual countries. Mélitz (2002) shows that sharing a common language
promotes international trade. In addition, there is a large literature on language proficiency
and earnings (see e.g. Chiswick and Miller 1995) and a new literature on the possible linguistic
organisation of the European Union (see Ginsburgh, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber 2005).
4The economics of networks has been extensively studied in the industrial organisation
literature; see Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for a recent survey. Research along this line has
generally focused on the problem of adaption and coordination from the perspective of profit-
maximising firms.
5The assignment of the dominant role to the M group is without loss of generality. We
do not explain here the reasons why one group becomes the politically dominant group. This
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speak M ish and the Ns speak N ish. We assume that communication between
two agents is possible if and only if they speak a common language.
Value is created through bilateral production between individuals. Each
individual has the opportunity to produce once with every other individual.
Bilateral production occurs if and only if the two partners are able to commu-
nicate; if they cannot communicate, the value of production is equal to zero.
2.1 Schools
Individuals choose whether or not to attend school. An individual who under-
takes education becomes skilled and produces 1+σ (with σ > 0) upon meeting
any agent with whom she is able to communicate. An uneducated individual
produces 1 with any partner speaking the same language.
Schooling also involves language training, depending on the school charac-
teristics. Schools can be bilingual, N unilingual, orM unilingual. The personal
cost c of undertaking education is assumed to be constant across the population
and independent of the school type.
Anyone attending a bilingual school becomes bilingual. The expected utility
of attending a bilingual school is
U b = −c+ 1+ σ; (1)
that is, an individual who attends school pays c, becomes skilled and ends up
speaking both languages, and thus produces 1 + σ with every individual in the
economy.
In an L unilingual school, Lish is the unique language of instruction. We
assume that anyone undertaking unilingual Lish education ends up speaking
Lish only. Thus, for instance, a native N ish speaker who attends a unilingual
M school learns M ish and loses her initial language.6 Let µlul (resp., µ
−lu
l )
be the fraction of native Lish speakers who attend an L unilingual (resp., −L
unilingual) school. Similarly, µbl denotes the proportion of native Lish speakers
who attend a bilingual school. Finally, µ is the vector of education levels. The
expected utility of attending a unilingual L school is then
U lu(µ) = −c+ (pl(1− µ
−lu
l
) + p−l(µ
b
−l + µ
lu
−l))(1 + σ) for l =m,n. (2)
The interpretation is that an individual pays c, becomes skilled, and speaks
Lish when leaving school. She gets 1+σ from production with the pl(1−µ
−lu
l
)
native Lish speakers who have not attended a unilingual school in the other
is as in Lang (1986), where one group is exogenously assigned the role of the “economically
dominant” group because its capital/labour ratio is assumed to be larger than that of the
other group.
6 Indeed, as shown by linguists (see e.g. Fishman 1977 for English and Hagège 1996 for
France), one crucial factor behind language shift in populations over generations is the choice
of the language(s) of instruction in school. In other words, languages not given the status
of medium of instruction in primary school tend to be replaced by the language used in
school. Here for simplicity we assume that this language shift takes place in the life span
of one generation. Mass media, migrations and parental choices are other important factors
behind language shift. For a dynamic setup in which the language spoken by the children
(exogenously) depends on the language spoken by the parents and on the language spoken in
the geographical location, see John and Yi (2001).
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language and with the p−l(µ
b
−l + µ
lu
−l) native speakers of the other language
that have learnt Lish either in a bilingual school or in a unilingual L school.
Finally, an unskilled L has the same production partners as an individual
attending a unilingual Lish school, as she speaks Lish. This individual saves
on the cost of education but obtains a value of only 1 when producing:
U l(µ) = pl(1− µ
−lu
l
) + p−l(µ
b
−l + µ
lu
−l) for l = m,n. (3)
2.2 Education systems
An education system is defined as a menu of school type choices for each lan-
guage group L = {M,N}. Although there are 49 possible education systems,7
Proposition 4 (see Section 5) shows that there is no system that the dominant
prefer to the three following systems, to which we restrict our attention. Under
laissez-faire, each individual taking education freely chooses whether to attend
a unilingual M school, a unilingual N school, or a bilingual school. Under the
N bilingual system, the Ms are restricted to unilingual M schools and the Ns
to bilingual schools. Finally, under the M unilingual system, only unilingual
M schools are allowed and so any individual attending school ends up speaking
M ish only.
2.3 Equilibrium
The timing of the game is as follows. First, anticipating the future levels of edu-
cation, the education system is chosen so as to maximise the expected utility of
the dominant group. Second, each individual independently and simultaneously
chooses whether to undertake education. Without loss of generality, we con-
sider symmetric Nash equilibria in which all members of each group randomise
between education and staying unskilled with the same probability.
3 Equilibrium education levels
3.1 Laissez-faire
If unilingual and bilingual schools cost the same, then any individual who invests
in education will choose a bilingual school because it provides her with a second
language and thus, ceteris paribus, enlarges her set of production partners.
Then, under laissez-faire (denoted by d for “deregulated”), µmul = µ
nu
l = 0 and
µdl = µ
b
l for l ∈ {m,n}. Subtracting (3) from (1) and using these expressions,
the net incentive for taking education is here
Udl (µ
b
−l) = −c+ p−l(1− µ
b
−l) + σ for l = m,n; (4)
that is, a native Lish speaker who undertakes education pays c, learns language
−L, and thus gains as production partners the p−l(1−µ
b
−l) native −L speakers
7There are seven possible arrangements for each group, namely: (i) unrestricted choice;
access to any school (ii) except N unilingual, (iii) exceptM unilingual, or (iv) except bilingual;
access only to (v) M unilingual, (vi) N unilingual, or (vii) bilingual. Seven arrangements for
each of the two groups yields a total of 49 systems.
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who do not speak Lish because they do not go to school. This is the com-
munication effect of education. Moreover, there is a productivity gain σ from
education that derives from the ability of the bilingual individual to produce
an additional amount σ with any other individual.8
The Nash equilibria (γdn, γ
d
m) = (γ
b
n, γ
b
m) of this game are depicted in Figure
1. When the productivity gain covers the cost of education (σ > c), undertak-
ing education is a dominating strategy for everybody. At the other extreme,
if education is very expensive (c > σ + max{pm, pn}), then any educational
investment is a dominated strategy and nobody attends school.
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Figure 1 : Equilibrium education levels ),( bmbn γγ  under laissez-faire 
For intermediate values of c−σ, intergroup interactions become relevant and
the communication effect plays a role in equilibrium. From (4), the incentives to
attend school for each group are decreasing in the education level of the other
group, as learning the other language becomes less interesting for a higher
prevalence of bilingualism in the other group (a “duplication” effect). If group
−L becomes fully educated, then all its members become bilingual, and thus
can be reached by the uneducated Ls. In this case, education simply affects
the productivity of the Ls (Udl (1) = σ − c from (4)), and is unprofitable for
them since c > σ. In turn, the absence of education among the Ls makes group
−L willing to invest in schooling only if doing so generates a sufficient number
pl of additional production partners–that is, if U
d
−l(0) = pl + σ − c ≥ 0.
Hence, (1, 0) and (0, 1) are equilibria if respectively c−σ ∈ (0, pm) and c−σ ∈
(0, pn). The two cases are not mutually exclusive, because both equilibria arise
simultaneously if the two groups are roughly equal in size and education is not
too expensive.9
8 In countries where the language of the dominated has low prestige or where language
groups have (strong) political identities, the dominant may not bother to learn carefully the
language of the dominated when attending bilingual schools. In our model, if the dominant
do not learn at all the language of the dominated then laissez-faire becomes identical to the
bilingual system.
9
Udl ((p−l + σ− c)/p−l) = 0 implies that there also exists an interior laissez-faire equilib-
rium, ((pn + σ − c)/pn, (pm + σ − c)/pm), in this case.
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3.2 The N bilingual system
Under the N bilingual system (also referred to simply as the bilingual system),
denoted by bi, the Ms can attend only M unilingual schools and the Ns can
attend only bilingual schools.10 Thus, µbm = µ
nu
m = 0, µ
mu
n = µ
nu
n = 0, µ
bi
m =
µmum , and µ
bi
n = µ
b
n. Given these expressions, subtracting (3) from (1) for l = n
yields the net benefit from education for a native N ish speaker:
U bin = −c+ pm + σ. (5)
The individual pays c, reaches pm additional partners as she learns M ish, and
gains additional output σ, because she is now skilled and can produce with
everybody.11
In turn, subtracting (3) from (2) for l = m shows that the net benefit from
education for the Ms is
U bim(µ
b
n) = −c+ (pm + pnµ
b
n)σ. (6)
Because both the uneducated and educated Ms speak M ish only and produce
with the pm + pnµ
b
n M ish speakers, the impact of education for an M is here
confined to the productivity effect σ.12
The Nash equilibria (γbin , γ
bi
m) = (γ
b
n, γ
um
m ) of this game are depicted in
Figure 2. When education is cheap (c < σ), the productivity effect alone is
sufficient to render education a dominating strategy for the Ns because by (5),
U bin = −c+pm+σ > 0. Anticipating the high education levels of the Ns, the
skill effect is sufficiently strong to render education profitable also for the Ms
(U bim(1) > 0). Hence, full education is the unique equilibrium in this case. As
soon as the cost of education becomes larger than σ, education is a dominated
strategy for the Ms (U bim(µ
b
n) < 0 ∀µ
b
n). Instead, the Ns are still willing to
pay for education if and only if the pm new production possibilities it generates
compensate for the insufficient productivity effect c−σ. Hence, the Ns become
bilingual provided c− σ ∈ (0, pm) and otherwise remain uneducated.
13
10 It would have been equivalent here to assume that the Ns are free to choose between the
three types of schools, since this would have implied that in equilibrium they choose bilingual
schools. However, the two assumptions are no longer equivalent in Section 6.3, where we
consider the case of higher cost of bilingual schools.
11Comparing (5) with (4) for l = n, it appears that schooling incentives are higher here for
the Ns than under laissez-faire, since theMs never learn N ish and so schooling always enlarges
the set of production partners for the Ns. In contrast, under laissez-faire an uneducated N
could still produce with the pmµ
d
m
bilingual Ms.
12This implies that the representative M has lower incentives for education than under
laissez-faire (see (4)), where education could also enlarge her set of production partners.
13Comparing Figure 2 with Figure 1, the Ns take more education than under laissez-faire
while the reverse is true for the Ms.
8
               mp  
                     1                                                     
 
                                                                                   
                                                              
 
                                             )0,1(  
                                        
                                                                    
         )1,1(                                                                                                          
                                                                    )0,0(  
 
 
 
 
 
                       0                                                                         1            σ−c  
Figure 2 : Equilibrium education levels ),( ummbn γγ  under bilingualism 
3.3 The M unilingual system
Under theM unilingual system (referred to simply as the unilingual system and
denoted by uni), anyone undertaking education must go to a unilingual M ish
school; in other words, µbl = µ
nu
l = 0 and µ
uni
l = µ
mu
l for l = {m,n} by institu-
tional design. Thus, just as under bilingualism, the Ms never end up speaking
N ish, and their net gain from education is still given by (6). Subtracting (3)
from (2) for l = n, the net benefit of taking education for a representative N
becomes
Uunin (µ
mu
n ) = −c+ (pm + pnµ
mu
n )σ + pm + pnµ
mu
n − pn(1− µ
mu
n ). (7)
When attending school, this individual pays c, becomes skilled, and shifts lan-
guage from N ish to M ish. In (7), the productivity gain from education is given
by (pm+pnµmun )σ–that is, the marginal value of education σ multiplied by the
production partners (theMs and the other skilled Ns) after schooling. In addi-
tion, education alters the set of production partners. This communication effect
is captured by the remaining terms in (7). First, speaking M ish after school
enables production with the pm native M ish speakers and with the pnµ
mu
n new
M ish speakers. At the same time, the skilled N forgets N ish and thus can no
longer produce with the pn(1− µ
mu
n ) unskilled Ns.
Equation (7) generates an insight that is crucial to understanding the prefer-
ences over education systems. For the Ns, attending school under unilingualism
implies both becoming skilled and shifting language. Clearly, both features of
unilingual schooling are more attractive the smaller the number ofN ish speakers
and, in particular, the larger the number of other Ns attending the unilingual
school. This positive communication externality is thus at the origin of a band-
wagon or snowball effect in the schooling decisions of the Ns. Indeed, it is easy
to check from (7) that the net return to schooling for an N is increasing in the
number of Ns taking education (µmun ). If the bandwagon effect is sufficiently
strong, it generates multiple equilibria. In addition to the possibility of two ex-
treme equilibria in which either all or none of the Ns take education, an interior
9
equilibrium may exist.14 Intuitively, for the bandwagon effect to play a role in
equilibrium, the dominated group must be sufficiently large; otherwise, avoid-
ing school and restricting oneself to intragroup production is never profitable
for the an N .
The Nash equilibria equilibria (γunin , γ
uni
m ) = (γ
um
n , γ
um
m ) of this game are
depicted in Figure 3 (see Appendix A for full details). The pm(c−σ) line char-
acterises the critical size of the dominant group below which the bandwagon
effect comes into play. It is upward sloping because education becomes less
attractive as schooling costs increase, and thus remaining an N ish speaker is
profitable even if the size of the N group shrinks. Above the pm(c − σ) line,
the dominant group is so large–and thus the productivity gain and communi-
cation effect are so strong relative to the cost of education–that education is
a dominant strategy for the Ns. Then, the Ms become educated if schooling is
sufficiently cheap (c < σ) and abstain from education otherwise.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium education levels ),( mummun γγ  under the unilingual system, with nmmn pppy /)( −≡  
Southeast of the pm line in Figure 3, the bandwagon effect induces multiple
equilibria. The fear of being caught alone as an N ish speaker induces high
equilibrium education, but it may equally well be that an expected disinterest
in education among the Ns de facto discourages education.
4 Welfare
Expected welfare is obtained by adding up individual utility levels:
W (µ) =
∑
l=m,n
pl[µ
mu
l U
mu(µ) + µnul U
nu(µ)
+µblU
b + (1− µmul − µ
nu
l − µ
b
l )U l(µ)].
(8)
In the presence of a benevolent social planner who is able to enforce welfare-
maximising education levels under each system, the following proposition holds.
14This unstable equilibrium is sometimes referred to as a tipping equilibrium, a term coined
by Schelling (1978).
10
Proposition 1 Under centralisation, laissez-faire yields (weakly) higher ex-
pected welfare than any other education system.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Given identical costs of unilingual and bilingual schools, the total expendi-
tures associated with a given educational level are the same regardless of the
education system. However, production (and thus expected utility) is larger the
larger the proportion of bilingual individuals. Since bilingualism is maximised
under laissez-faire, this system is always chosen by a central planner who can
control education levels.
In reality, of course, no central planner can perfectly control the amount of
effort that students spend on their studies–even in a system with mandatory
education.15 In order to capture this degree of freedom, we consider a situation
in which the central planner picks the educational system and then individuals
decide whether or not to attend school. Under decentralised school attendance
choice, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2 In the choice between laissez-faire, bilingualism, and unilin-
gualism, the system yielding a higher decentralised welfare is depicted in Figure
4.16
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Figure 4 shows that laissez-faire ceases to be optimal in regions (I) and
(IIa) owing to the different schooling incentives in the three systems. In region
(I), the cost of education is high enough for it to be optimal that only the
minority become educated: given pm > 0.5, only the Ns should attend school.
However, under laissez-faire, the schooling incentives of theMs are strong if few
of the Ns are expected to take education. The majority (i.e., the wrong group)
may thus end up undertaking education. In contrast, under the two other
systems, the Ms cannot learn N ish; this reduces their incentives to undertake
education and guarantees that only theNs (if any) take education. In the choice
between unilingualism and bilingualism, both yield full communication and
exclusive minority education as the unique equilibrium in region (Ia). In region
(Ib), bilingualism is preferred because the bandwagon effect (which comes into
play when the dominated group is large) generates an additional no-education
equilibrium in the unilingual system. In region (IIa), laissez-faire is suboptimal
because it fails to generate sufficient schooling incentives. Yet the bandwagon
effect can raise schooling under the unilingual system to a level that would be
impossible to reach under either of the two other systems. Thus, even though
bilingual schools are technologically superior, a system that restricts (some)
15There is, for example, a growing empirical literature on the effectiveness of financial
incentives for school attendance in developing economies (see e.g. Bourguignon, Ferreira, and
Leite 2003 and the references therein).
16The figure is drawn assuming σ < 1, although this assumption is irrelevant to the results
we have obtained. Also, as previously shown, multiple equilibria sometimes arise under laissez-
faire and under the unilingual system. In models with multiple equilibria, predictions generally
depend on the equilibria under consideration. The ranking in this proposition builds on the
exclusion of interior unstable equilibria in parts of the parameter range for which pm < 0.5.
All subsequent results hold for comparisons of all equilibria.
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individuals from access to bilingual schools may be better because it provides
stronger schooling incentives than laissez-faire.
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Figure 4: System yielding a higher decentralised welfare: comparison among laissez-faire, unilingualism, and bilingualism 
Consider now all the possible education systems. An education system s
is said to be decentralised optimal if there exists no alternative system that is
(weakly or strictly) preferable to s in terms of decentralised welfare. Then, we
can state the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For pm > 0.5, the education systems depicted in Figure 4 are
decentralised optimal systems.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
When pm > 0.5, the education systems depicted in Figure 4 attain the
maximum centralised welfare level for c < 1 + σ except in region (IIa). In that
region, unilingualism generates the first-best welfare in one of its equilibria;
however, since no system is able to reproduce the first-best level as a unique
equilibrium, unilingualism is never outperformed. Finally, for c > 1 + σ, no
system induces positive education and so all systems are equivalent.
The three systems may all be suboptimal whenever the dominant group is
the minority. For example, the M bilingual system (where the Ms become
bilingual and the Ns never learn M ish) generates the social optimum (γmun +
γnun +γ
b
n = 0, γ
b
m = 1) as a unique equilibrium for pm ∈ (c−σ, 0.5) and pn > c−σ
when neither of the three systems above is capable of doing so.
5 The choice of education system
This section examines how theMs and the Ns rank different education systems,
taking into account the equilibrium schooling levels under each system. In
particular, we study whether language conflict can endogenously arise in our
setup and whether this conflict is of the expected type–that is, a situation
where the dominated favour the use of N ish in education while the dominant
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oppose it. In addition, we determine which political rules, if any, enable society
to reach a decentralised optimum.
The Ms have been exogenously assigned the role of dominance and thus
choose the system independently of whether they are a majority or a minority.
Proposition 4 shows that there is no education system that the Ms prefer to
laissez-faire, the unilingual system, and the bilingual system, and determines
when each of these three systems is chosen.
Proposition 4 In decentralised equilibrium, the following statements hold. (i)
If the cost of education is low (c < σ) or high (c > 1 + σ), then the dominant
weakly prefer laissez-faire and bilingualism to any other education system, or
are indifferent. (ii) For intermediate costs (σ < c < 1+σ): (a) if the dominant
group is sufficiently large (pm > c− σ), then the dominant weakly prefer bilin-
gualism to any other system or are indifferent; and (b) if the dominant group
is sufficiently small (pm < c − σ), then there exists no education system that
the dominant prefer to the unilingual system.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Every member of society would like to communicate with everybody else,
since having fewer production partners for a given schooling investment can
only reduce production opportunities and utility.
When education is cheap (c < σ), maximum communication is ensured un-
der both laissez-faire and the N bilingual system because attending a bilingual
school is a dominating strategy for the Ns. When c < σ, education is profitable
also for the Ms, since the cost is always recovered via increased productivity.
Instead, for instance, unilingualism fails to guarantee that all the Ns attend
school; hence the Ms, who would not learn N ish, may not be able to produce
with everybody and so do not choose that system.
When education becomes more expensive (σ < c < 1 + σ), the maximum
gain from education σ becomes insufficient to cover the cost of education; then
the Ms try to eschew education while still producing with everybody. Laissez-
faire is not always useful for this purpose when the dominant group is large
(pm > c − σ). Indeed, under this system, if the Ns choose not to attend
school then it is individually rational for each M to attend a bilingual school
whenever the productivity gain coupled with the communication effect cover
c. The dominant effectively commit to not undertaking education by choosing
bilingualism, which legally prevents them from learning N ish. With this com-
mitment device, intergroup production can be initiated only by the Ns, which
in turn lowers (raises) the education incentives of the Ms (Ns) and guaran-
tees maximum communication paid for by the dominated. When the dominant
group is small (i.e., pm < c− σ), the bandwagon effect may generate the best
outcome for the Ms under unilingualism whereas laissez-faire and bilingualism
fail to create sufficient incentives for the Ns to undertake education.17 More
generally, it can be shown that any other system has an equilibrium where the
17For c−σ < 1−pm in this area, the choice of theMs between laissez-faire and unilingualism
is indeterminate. Although the best outcome can be reached only under unilingualism, the
Ns prefer (γd
n
, γd
m
) = (0, 1) to (γuni
n
, γuni
m
) = (0, 0).
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Ns do not invest in education and so cannot be better than unilingualism from
the Ms’ viewpoint.18
Proposition 5 characterises the preferences of the dominated with regard to
education systems.
Proposition 5 The dominated prefer laissez-faire to bilingualism (or are in-
different between the two) and prefer the bilingual to the unilingual system (or
are indifferent between the two).
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
Under laissez-faire, the Ms learn N ish whenever they undertake education;
thus the dominated can gain production partners without investing in edu-
cation, which explains why they prefer laissez-faire to bilingualism. Instead,
bilingualism and unilingualism have in common that the cost of intergroup
communication is always borne by the Ns. And among these two systems, the
Ns prefer bilingualism owing to the absence of negative network externalities
and thus of bandwagon effects. In contrast, under unilingualism, the Ns are
in some cases “compelled” to undertake education even if this is relatively ex-
pensive, since doing so is the only way to learn M ish and to avoid remaining
isolated from the rest of society.
The joint implication of Propositions 4 and 5 is that language conflict always
comes with the desire of theMs to restrict the use of N ish in education and the
opposition of the Ns to this choice (see also Figure 5). This is an interesting
result because language conflict is here of the expected type and does not rely on
any direct utility that agents derive from speaking their own native language.19
In contrast, language conflict is an equilibrium phenomenon. The dominated
want their language to be a means of instruction in school not because they are
wedded to it but rather because abandoning it would force them to overinvest
in education. Likewise, by legally restricting the amount of N speakers, the
dominant maximise the incentive for learning M ish and thereby force the cost
of communication on the dominated. In other words, the Ms free-ride on the
costs of speaking a common language, which are entirely borne by the Ns.
More precisely, in region (I) of Figure 5, the dominant support a regulation
that precludes them from learning N ish. Intuitively, the Ms need a way of
committing not to learn N ish in order for the Ns to pay for education. This
is not possible under laissez-faire, since it might be individually rational for
the Ms to become bilingual.20 In contrast, the Ns would like the Ms to learn
N ish so as to gain additional production partners without paying for education,
and this is achieved under laissez-faire. In region (II), the dominant want
to ban the use of N ish in education for everybody. As explained previously,
18Finally, if education is very costly (c > 1 + σ) then the choice of system does not matter
because nobody ever goes to school.
19Adding an exogenous utility term of speaking one’s mother tongue would only reinforce
the language conflict. The dominated would have an additional reason for preferring bilingual
schools, while the choice of the dominant would remain unaffected (since they maintain their
mother tongue under all three systems).
20 In region (Ic), the Ms prefer bilingualism to unilingualism in order to avoid the possible
negative bandwagon effect under unilingualism. The bandwagon effect does not play in region
(Ia), which explains why the Ms are indifferent between the two systems in this region.
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unilingualism in this region provides stronger incentives than bilingualism or
laissez-faire for the dominated to become educated. Here the Ms prefer the
unilingual system–hoping to lock the Ns into a high-education equilibrium–
whereas the dominated prefer bilingualism or laissez-faire precisely in order to
avoid that situation.
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Figure 5: Choice of education system 
Under a wide range of circumstances, there is no political tension over the
choice of education system. When education is relatively cheap (c < σ) both
groups either prefer laissez-faire or bilingualism or are indifferent between the
three systems. Education is so cheap that it is important for both groups to
generate the strongest possible incentive for schooling, thus avoiding potential
negative bandwagon effects. For this reason, unilingualism is not chosen in
region (III). When education is expensive (c > 1 + σ), nobody ever becomes
educated and so the choice of system does not matter.
Having identified the preferences of the two groups, we are now able to
discuss the welfare properties of various political systems with respect to the
choice of language of instruction. Recall that the education system is chosen to
maximise the expected utility of the dominant (the Ms) regardless of whether
they are a majority. Majority rule, which can be interpreted as a democratic
system, thus corresponds to a situation where pm > 0.5; minority rule (i.e.,
autocracy) prevails whenever pm < 0.5. Comparing Figures 4 and 5 and using
Proposition 3, we have the following result.
Proposition 6 Under majority rule, an optimal decentralised system is always
implemented. Under minority rule, the use of the dominated group language is
too often restricted.
The dominant achieve maximum communication by maximising the num-
ber of M ish speakers. From a welfare viewpoint, cost-efficient communication
requires that the minority learn the majority language. The dominant and the
majority are the same under majority rule, which explains why majority rule
works well. Under minority rule, cost-efficient communication requires that the
minority (the Ms) learn N ish; however, the Ms impose systems that restrict
access to N unilingual schools or to bilingual schools and that result in the
majority becoming educated.
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6 Extensions
In this section, we extend the basic model to consider, in turn: (i) education
subsidies; (ii) the possibility for native Lish speakers attending a −L unilingual
school to retain their mother tongue and thus become bilingual; (iii) an open
economy with fl Lish speakers abroad, l = {m,n}; (iv) an additional cost κ of
attending bilingual schools; and (v) a combination of extensions (iii) and (iv).
The expected utilities of attending the different types of school or remaining un-
educated in extensions (ii)—(v) are presented in Appendix C; the full analytical
details of all the extensions are contained in a Technical Appendix.21
6.1 Education subsidies
Failure to internalise communication externalities may lead to inefficient ed-
ucation decisions, as shown in Section 4. However, the inefficiencies can be
overcome by an appropriate transfer system as follows.
Proposition 7 There exists an education subsidy, targeted to the minority and
financed by a proportional tax on production, that implements the socially op-
timal schooling level as the unique equilibrium under laissez-faire with decen-
tralised schooling choice. However, the centralised optimum cannot always be
implemented through a Pareto-improving policy.
Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
The question of whether a transfer system can be voluntarily implemented
under laissez-faire is related to whether or not it is Pareto-improving. As shown
in the proof of Proposition 7, the proposed transfer system is strictly Pareto-
improving whenever the source of the inefficiency is undereducation of both
groups. In this case, we expect such a transfer system to be implemented under
laissez-faire. If, instead, the problem lies in education of the wrong group (the
majority), then there exists no combination of education subsidies and transfers
(not even targeted lump-sum) that provide a Pareto improvement with respect
to all (stable) laissez-faire equilibria. A Pareto improvement would require
that the entire cost of the subsidy be borne by the minority. However, this is
worse from the minority’s viewpoint than an equilibrium in which the major-
ity undertakes education. A Pareto-improving policy would therefore demand
that the transfer system be made contingent on the laissez-faire equilibrium.
This, in turn, would require an equilibrium refinement that selects among strict
equilibria.
6.2 Mother tongue persistence
Imagine that the mother tongue is retained with probability α after unilingual
education in the other language. In this case, every N attending a unilingual
M ish school under unilingualism becomes bilingual with probability α and thus
is subject to the bandwagon effect only with probability 1 − α.22 The result
21The Technical Appendix is available upon request and at http://www.ifn.se/thomast.
22 In equilibrium, nobody ever attends a unilingual school in the other language under laissez-
faire or bilingualism, which implies that these two systems remain unchanged.
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is a weaker bandwagon effect under unilingualism, which reduces the ability of
this system to generate higher schooling levels than bilingualism or laissez-faire
when education is expensive. However, unless persistence is perfect (α = 1),
the results remain qualitatively unchanged. The bandwagon effect survives, and
there always exists an area in which the Ms prefer unilingualism as well as an
area in which unilingualism is a decentralised optimal system. Moreover, lan-
guage conflicts follow the same pattern as in the benchmark case, and majority
rule still implements a socially optimal system.
6.3 Cross-border spillovers
Consider an exogenous number fl of Lish speakers abroad, l = {m,n}. Because
the foreigners never shift language or become bilingual, their presence gives an
additional advantage to bilingual schools (and thus to laissez-faire), since any
system restricting access to bilingual schools in the home country eliminates
production opportunities with foreigners. For instance, under unilingualism or
bilingualism, the native M ish speakers can never produce with the fn N ish-
speaking foreigners. As a result, whenever the distribution abroad is skewed
towards N ish, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 8 If fn ≥ max{pm + fm, (1 + fm)/(2 + σ)}, both groups always
(weakly) prefer laissez-faire to bilingualism and unilingualism.
Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
The intuition is simple: For fn sufficiently large, the Ms choose the only
system that allows them to learn N ish and thus reach the large number of N ish
speaking foreigners, while the Ns still have no incentive to restrict the use of
their own language.
A second new result arises when fn is large relative to pn (fn > pn/(1+σ)).
In this case, any native N ish speaker retains many production partners abroad
(fn) even if the other native N ish speakers were to shift language by attending
school under unilingualism, which implies that the bandwagon effect becomes
irrelevant. Then unilingualism can no longer generate high schooling levels
among the Ns and ceases to be of interest to the dominant. The presence
of a foreign language group may therefore serve to protect the language of a
dominated minority.
In the rest of the cases (i.e., when the distribution abroad is balanced and fn
is small relative to pn), most of the qualitative results of the baseline model still
hold, as in this case opening the economy simply increases its size. In particular,
unilingualism and bilingualism are chosen by theMs in some cases and can also
be optimal in the absence of transfers, and the same type of language conflicts
are observed. However, majority rule may result in the choice of a suboptimal
system.23
23 In particular, for fn > fm, the social planner may prefer the Ms rather than the Ns to
invest in education (learn the other language) even if pm > 0.5. Indeed, the higher educational
costs associated with having pm > pn individuals educated may be compensated for by a
smaller loss of cross-border production opportunities (i.e., fm times pn instead of fn times
pm). Meanwhile, the Ms still prefer to free-ride on the education of the Ns by choosing
unilingualism or bilingualism.
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6.4 Higher cost of bilingual schools
Whenever bilingual schools are more costly than unilingual schools (κ > 0),
everybody taking education under laissez-faire chooses unilingual schools in
stable equilibria. Indeed, since only corner equilibria are stable, any equilibrium
with bilingual school attendance would be characterised by full communication.
Then each individual who attends a bilingual school could save κ and keep the
same production partners by shifting to a unilingual school in the language
shared by everybody.
Although the central planner, given κ > 0, never chooses the bilingual
system, theMs may still implement bilingualism because the extra cost of edu-
cation falls on the Ns. Excessive bilingualism occurs whenever the two groups
are roughly equal in size and pm < 0.5. Not only is the majority forced to learn
the language of the minority in this case, but an additional distortion stems
from this taking place in bilingual rather than unilingual schools. However,
under majority rule, a suboptimal system is never chosen.
The sensitivity of bilingual school attendance under laissez-faire to the cost
differential κ may cast doubt on the robustness of the baseline results. However,
bilingual school attendance under laissez-faire is restored in an open economy
whenever the differential cost κ of becoming bilingual is compensated for by a
larger expansion in the set of production partners abroad. In this case, bilingual
education may again be socially optimal, and the qualitative results of the
benchmark model still hold. We thus view the closed economy with differential
education cost as a case with too large a cost of learning an additional language.
7 Historical evidence
7.1 19th-century Belgium
Upon Belgium’s independence in 1830, French had a predominant role even
though French speakers were a minority.24 In Flanders, Dutch was partly used
as language of instruction in primary schools; however, secondary education was
systematically provided in French until 1883, when a law established that some
subjects in secondary public schools should be taught in Flemish. The initial
predominance of French has been explained by the fact that “[the] bourgeoisie
was overwhelmingly French-speaking, even in the Flemish provinces” (McRae
1986, p. 21) and that only 46,000 individuals in a population of about four
million were given the right to vote. In our model, this can be interpreted as a
dominant minority’s choice of unilingualism.
7.2 France
Language policy was an important political issue during the French Revolution
(1789—1794), and a series of French unilingual decrees were approved in 1794
by the radical revolutionaries (so-called montagnards; Hagège 1996). Although
these decrees did not survive the fall of the montagnards, they became the
foundations of French language policy (Weber 1976). In 1794, only about 40%
24Dutch (Flemish) speakers accounted for 57% of the population in 1846 (McRae 1986).
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Table 1: Proportion of French unilingual public schools at the département level
in France (1863)
Dependent variable: Proportion of French unilingual public schools
French speakers in the population 1.17**
(.442)
0.805
(.679)
0.210
(.753)
Amount paid for education by a family 0.318***
(.108)
0.291**
(.117)
0.267**
(.117)
Log income per head 0 .960*
(.482)
1.2
(1.24)
Unilingual French-speaking département (dummy) 3.03***
(.584)
2.97***
(.795)
Notes: Figures reported are the coefficients obtained from tobit estimation. Standard errors
are in parentheses, and *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respec-
tively. Data on language are from the Archives Nationales and can be found in Weber (1976).
Data on average income levels are from Vapereau (1867) and the remaining data are from
Ministère de l’Instruction Publique (1878). All data are for 1863.
of the population were native French speakers (Calvet 2002, p. 218).25 Among
the other language groups, the largest was Occitan and next came Breton and
Alsacian.26
Our model predicts that minority size may not be the most relevant variable
for understanding the choice of education system. Indeed, inspecting Figure 5
reveals that, in the absence of information concerning the net cost c−σ of educa-
tion, the size pm of the dominant group does not determine whether unilingual
or bilingual schools are chosen at equilibrium. Using data from Weber (1976)
for 1863, we can compute the proportion of public schools using only French
in each of the 89 départements as well as the proportion of French speakers in
the local population. The data show that there was regional variation in edu-
cational systems before the introduction of the 1880—1882 Ferry Laws, which
instituted free primary education and legally established French as the only
language of instruction in schools (Chervel 1992).
We next regress the proportion of French unilingual schools on a number of
département-level variables for the 89 départements. The results are reported
in Table 1. Column 1 shows that there is a positive relationship between the
proportion of French speakers in the population and the proportion of French
unilingual schools. In addition, the proportion of French unilingual schools is
positively related to the average direct cost of education for parents in each
département. This may indicate that parents were willing to invest more in
education if schools were in French–most likely by a social mobility argument,
since a knowledge of French was necessary in skilled occupations.
However, this first regression does not take into account that, in the 55 fully
French-speaking départements, the possibility of having non—French-speaking
schools was not even considered. We control for this by introducing a dummy
variable for unilingual French-speaking départements in the regressions of columns
25This estimate is based on the language report conducted by Grégoire (1794).
26Additionally, small minorities were speaking Franco-provençal, Basque, Catalan, Corsican,
or Flemish. Each département (with the exception of the Basses-Pyrénées) had at most two
language groups.
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2 and 3. The results so obtained show that the relationship between the pro-
portion of French speakers in the population and the proportion of French
unilingual schools is no longer significant.
7.3 Finland
The current institutional language framework in Finland was established by
the Constitution of 1919 and a series of language laws, the most important of
which was approved in 1922. In 1920, Swedish speakers constituted only 11% of
the population (McRae 1997); the rest of the population spoke Finnish, except
for a tiny Sami group. Nevertheless, the Constitution recognised Finnish and
Swedish as national languages on an equal basis. The language clauses of the
Constitution were approved by overwhelming majorities that ranged from 88%
to 96% (Eduskunta-Riksdag 1920, pp. 1028—30), with support coming from
both language groups. The few deputies that opposed the approved system
belonged to Finnish-speaking parties and supported a system closer to Finnish
unilingualism (see Jackson 1938 and McRae 1997). At the same time, the
parties with support from the Swedish speakers never sustained Swedish unilin-
gualism, supporting instead the proposed symmetric bilingual system. For this
reason, we argue that the Finnish speakers at that time were (in terms of our
model) the dominant group, despite the historical overrepresentation of Swedish
speakers among the elite.
The educational system is such that each municipality must provide school-
ing in the minority language (Swedish or Finnish) once a certain number of
parents require it. Given the symmetry of the system, the unanimity for bilin-
gual schools in Finland may be viewed in terms of our model as unanimity for
laissez-faire, and it can be explained in an economy with cross-border spillovers
in light of Proposition 8. According to this proposition, if the language dis-
tribution abroad is skewed towards the language of the dominated (here, the
Swedish speakers), then laissez-faire is always unanimously chosen. Taking into
account the number of Finnish and Swedish speakers in Finland and Sweden
in 1920, we have pm = 0.89, pn = 0.11, fm = 0.0097 and fn = 1.89; hence
the condition in Proposition 8 on the skewness of the language distribution is
satisfied even for σ = 0.27
8 Conclusion and further discussion
Although many countries are multilingual or have been historically formed by
several language groups, language diversity has not always lead to language
conflict between the groups when deciding on the language of instruction in
school; nor has it always been the case that both language groups have agreed
upon a unilingual or a bilingual system. One way to understand this variety of
outcomes is to assume that agents enjoy some utility from speaking their own
language and that compromise over language issues through political bargaining
is reached only in some cases.
27 In 1920, Finland was inhabited by 341,000 Swedish speakers and 2,764,000 Finnish speak-
ers (McRae 1997, p. 86); Sweden had 5,904,489 inhabitants (Statistiska Centralbyrån 2006),
of which 30,247 were Finnish-speakers (Statistiska Centralbyrån 1924, p. 14).
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In this paper, we take a different stand on the issue and propose a model
centered on individual incentives to attend school. We show that these incen-
tives vary across groups depending on the nature of the education system. In
particular, education systems restricting the use of the language of the politi-
cally dominated group produce stronger incentives for the dominated to attend
school. As a result, the dominated either bear a large part of the costs asso-
ciated with adopting a common language or actively defend the use of their
mother tongue in order to avoid paying such costs. In contrast, the dominant
may defend such a restriction in order to free-ride on the educational invest-
ment of the dominated. Thus language conflict of the expected type is shown
to arise endogenously as the result of economic conflict.
Should we expect language conflicts to result in the adoption of a subopti-
mal language system? According to our model, the answer crucially depends
on the nature of political institutions. Specifically, we show that democratic
institutions (interpreted as majority rule) choose an optimal education system,
whereas autocracies too often restrict the use of the dominated group’s lan-
guage.
Our model delivers a number of empirically grounded results via a parsimo-
nious set of economic and political features, but there are aspects of existing
language policies that can be rationalised only by further modeling assumptions.
In particular, our model does not address the within-country regional distribu-
tion of languages and does not allow for a two-tier political decision process–
say at the local and federal level. Some countries admit multiple languages
of instruction while restricting access to specific languages on a geographical
basis. According to this territoriality principle, the law specifies the linguistic
boundaries inside the country and provides each territory with instruments for
retaining its legally defined language(s). In Switzerland, the territoriality prin-
ciple was established by its 1848 Constitution in order to neutralise possible
effects of the newly declared freedom of movement about the country on the
language composition of cantons (McRae 1983). At the same time, the Con-
stitution instituted the equality of German, French, and Italian together with
the cantonal choice of languages. Based on this institutional equilibrium which
is still in force today (except for a greater role given to Romansh), some can-
tons with sizeable language minorities have implemented unilingual education
systems. In Belgium, a similar system was instituted by the 1962—63 language
laws: currently Dutch is the unique language of instruction in Flanders and
the same applies for French in Wallonia, while French and Dutch coexist as
languages of instruction in the Brussels capital region.28 A framework that
accounts for such institutional choices should include geographical distance and
the cross-regional migration decisions of individuals.
Language choice in education can also lead to conflicts between different
political decision levels, as in the case of Canada. In 1977, Bill 101 in Quebec
established that “only children whose father or mother received most of their
primary education in English in Quebec have access to English schools” (Bar-
baud 1998, p. 185). However, this was overturned by a new active bilingual
28There are exceptions in some small specific territories of Flanders and Wallonia, where
both French and Dutch are used as languages of instruction up to primary school. In the
German-speaking cantons, German and French are the languages of instruction.
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policy at the federal level (Canada Constitution Act of 1982) which established
that all Canadian citizens whose mother tongue is French or English–or who
have received their primary education in Canada in one of these two languages–
have the right to have all their children educated in that same language (when
the number of children so warrants). The potential conflict between federal
and regional institutions in the determination of language policies poses an
interesting direction for future research.
Appendix A. Equilibrium education levels under unilin-
gualism
A.1. Education levels of the Ns
Define pm ≡ (1 + c)/(2 + σ); then substitute into (7) and rewrite to get
Uunin (µ
um
n ) = (2 + σ) (pnµ
um
n + pm − pm). Now c > 1 + σ implies pm > 1,
so Uunin (µ
um
n ) < 0 and hence γ
uni
n = 0 in this case. Next, c < 1 + σ
implies pm < 1 and so education is a strictly dominating strategy for all
pm > pm; hence γ
uni
n = 1 in this case. If c < 1 + σ and pm < pm, then
Uunin (1) = (2 + σ) (1− pm) > 0, U
uni
n (0) = (2 + σ) (pm − pm) < 0, and
Uunin ((pm − pm)/pn) = 0 together imply that all γ
uni
n ∈ {0, (pm − pm)/pn, 1}
are equilibria.
A.2. Education levels of the Ms
By (6), Uunim (µ
um
n ) ≤ U
uni
m (1) = σ − c implies that γ
uni
m = 0 is the unique
equilibrium for c > σ. Next, Uunim (µ
um
n ) ≥ U
uni
m (0) = pmσ − c implies
γunim = 1 for all pm > c/σ. For c < σ and pm < c/σ, the equilibrium education
level γunim depends on γ
uni
n . First, γ
uni
n = 1 implies γ
uni
m = 1 since U
uni
m (1) =
σ−c > 0. Second, γunin = 0 implies γ
uni
m = 0 sinceU
uni
m (0) = (pm−c/σ)σ < 0.
Finally, Uunim ((pm − pm)/pn) = pmσ − c = (σ − 2c)/(2 + σ). Therefore,
γunin = (pm − pm)/pn implies that γ
uni
n = 1 for c < σ/2 and that γ
uni
n = 0 for
c > σ/2.
Appendix B. Proofs
Let Γs be the set of equilibria under education system s and let γs ∈ Γs be a
specific equilibrium under s. Let usl (γ
s) = γmul U
mu(γs)+γnul U
nu(γs)+γblU
b+
(1 − γbl − γ
mu
l − γ
nu
l )U l(γ
s) be the indirect utility for a native Lish speaker
under s given the choice of γs. Group L is said to weakly prefer system s to
system s′ (denoted s l s
′) if at least one of them displays multiple equilibria
and if min{usl (γ
s) | γs ∈ Γs} ≥ max{us
′
l (γ
s′) | γs
′
∈ Γs
′
}. The preference is
strict (s l s
′) if the inequality is strict–no matter how many equilibria the
two systems generate. Finally, a native Lish speaker is indifferent between the
two systems (s ∼l s
′) if all equilibria generate usl (γ
s) = us
′
l (γ
s′). Subscript w
on the preference ordering denotes the social welfare ordering; W (γs) denotes
expected welfare, as defined in (8) for equilibrium γs. If s ∈ {d, uni, bi} then ex-
pected welfare is denoted W s(γsn, γ
s
m), with (γ
d
n, γ
d
m) = (γ
b
n, γ
b
m), (γ
uni
n , γ
uni
m ) =
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(γmun , γ
mu
m ), and (γ
bi
n , γ
bi
m) = (γ
b
n, γ
mu
m ). In addition, x denotes the optimal
(centralised) education levels.
B.1. Proof of Proposition 1
For any distribution µ of education levels, we show that there exists an alterna-
tive distribution µ˜ under d such that W (µ˜) ≥W (µ). Pick any µ and consider
µ˜, where a fraction µ˜l = µl = µ
b
l+µ
mu
l +µ
nu
l of the Ls (l ∈ {m,n}) are forced to
take education but are free to choose the type of school. Naturally, everybody
chooses a bilingual school under d. Hence, µ˜mul = µ˜
nu
l = 0 and µ˜
b
l = µ˜l = µl for
all l ∈ {m,n}. The welfare difference is
W (µ˜)−W (µ) =
∑
l=m,n
(plµ
lu
l + p−lµ
lu
−l)(U
b − U lu(µ))
+
∑
l=m,n
pl(1− µl)(U l(µ˜)−U l(µ)).
Now U b ≥ U lu(µ) and U l(µ˜) − U l(µ) = pmµ
−lu
m + pnµ
−lu
n ≥ 0 for l ∈ {m,n}
imply that W (µ˜) ≥ W (µ). We determine x = (xdn, x
d
m) by plugging µ
mu
l =
µnul = 0 and µ
b
l = µ
d
l for l ∈ {m,n} into (8) to derive the laissez-faire wel-
fare W d(µdn, µ
d
m) = 1− 2pmpn(1−µ
d
m)(1−µ
d
n) + (σ− c)
(
pmµ
d
m + pnµ
d
n
)
. Then
W d(1, 1)−W d(µdn, µ
d
m) = 2pmpn(1−µ
d
m)(1−µ
d
n)+(σ−c)
(
pm(1− µ
d
m) + pn(1− µ
d
n)
)
implies that x = (1, 1) for all c ≤ σ. Similarly, W d(1, 0) − W d(µdn, µ
d
m) =
µdm(c − σ)(2pm − 1 + pnµ
d
n) + pn(2pm + σ − c)(1 − µ
d
m)(1 − µ
d
n) implies that
x = (1, 0) for all c − σ ∈ (0, 2pm) and pm > 0.5. The proof that x = (0, 1) if
c− σ ∈ (0, 2pn) and pn > 0.5 is analogous. Finally, W d(0, 0)−W d(µdn, µ
d
m) =
pmµ
d
m(c− σ − 2pn) + pnµ
d
n(c− σ − 2pm)+ 2pmpnµ
d
mµ
d
n implies that x = (0, 0)
for all c− σ > 2max{pm, pn}.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 2
The equilibrium education levels γs ∈ Γs for s ∈ {d, uni, bi} are taken from
Section 3 and x from the preceding proof.
(i) For c < σ, d and bi both uniquely implement maximal communication
and education; so does uni, provided also that pm > pm ≡ (1 + c)/(2 + σ).
Hence, W d = W bi = Wuni = W d(x) in this case. If pm < pm then uni also
generates undereducation equilibria and so ceases to be optimal.
(ii) For c > 1+σ, no system generates positive education and so all systems
are equivalent.
(iiia) Let σ < c < 1 + σ and pm > 0.5. If pm > pm and pn < c − σ
also hold, then all three systems uniquely implement maximal communication
through maximal (no) education of the minority (majority) in the majority
language–that is, all systems attainW d(x). If instead pm > pm but pn > c−σ
(region Ia), then d may educate the wrong group and thus is no longer optimal.
For pn < c − σ and pm ∈ (c − σ, pm), uni may lead to undereducation and
hence is no longer optimal. Fourth, if pm ∈ (1/2, pm) and pn > c − σ (region
Ib), then of all the three systems only bi uniquely attains W d(x). Finally,
if pm ∈ (1/2, c − σ) (a subset of region II), then we have Γ
bi = Γd = (0, 0)
and Γuni = {(1, 0), ((pm − pm)/pn, 0), (0, 0)}. Given that W
uni(1, 0) = W d(x),
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Wuni((pm−pm)/pn, 0)−W
uni(0, 0) = (pm−pn)(pm−pm) > 0, andW
uni(0, 0) =
W bi(0, 0) =W d(0, 0), it follows that uni w bi ∼w d.
(iiib) If σ < c < 1 + σ and pm < 0.5, then d is the only system of the three
that can possibly implement x as an equilibrium; this happens for pn > c− σ.
Moreover, if pm < c − σ then d uniquely implements x, but if pm > c − σ
then d generates multiple equilibria. Restricting attention to stable equilibria,
we can still rank the three systems. W d(1, 0) = Wuni(1, 0) = W bi(1, 0) and
W s(1, 0) −W s(0, 0) = pn(2pm + σ − c) > 0 for s = uni, bi implies d w uni
and d w bi. Next, Γ
bi = Γd = {0, 0} if pn < c − σ. Given that W
bi(0, 0) >
Wuni(1, 0) if and only if pm < (c − σ)/2, it follows that d ∼w bi w uni for
pm < (c−σ)/2 and that uni w bi ∼w d for pm > (c−σ)/2 if we are considering
stable equilibria only (we are then back to region II).
B.3. Proof of Proposition 3
The preceding proof shows that the systems depicted in Figure 4 all attain
W d(x) through a unique equilibrium whenever pm > 0.5 and c < 1 + σ, except
for pm ∈ (1/2, c − σ). As a result, they cannot be outperformed by any other
system. For pm ∈ (1/2, c− σ) we have W
uni(1, 0) =W d(x), implying that any
system that outperforms uni must uniquely implement W d(x). However, as
long as pm < c− σ, any system will necessarily have γ˜n = γ˜
b
n + γ˜
mu
n + γ˜
nu
n = 0
as part of a stable equilibrium. Indeed, U lun (γ˜) ≤ U
b
n(γ˜) always holds (for
l = m,n) and U bn(γ˜) = σ + pm − c − pm(γ˜
b
m + γ˜
nu
m ) < 0 for pm < c − σ
and γ˜n = 0. Therefore, uni is a decentralised optimum in this case. Finally,
no system generates positive education for c > 1 + σ; hence, in this case, all
systems are equivalent in welfare.
B.4. Proof of Proposition 4
Compare an equilibrium γs under system s ∈ {d, uni, bi} such that γmun +γ
b
n = 1
to an arbitrary equilibrium γ˜ under system s′, where γsl and γ˜l denote the
aggregate education of group L in each of the equilibria. Observe first that
Umum (γ
s) = U b = 1+σ−c and that Um(γ
s) = 1. Some algebraic manipulations
yield usm(γ
s)− us
′
m(γ˜) = (γ
s
m − γ˜m)U
s
m(1) + γ˜
nu
m (pm(1− γ˜
b
m − γ˜
nu
m ) + pnγ˜
mu
n )
(1 + σ) + (γ˜num (1 + σ) + 1 − γ˜m)(pmγ˜
nu
m + pn(1 − γ˜
b
n − γ˜
mu
n )), which is non
negative because γsm < γ˜m ≤ 1 implies U
s
m(1) ≤ 0 and γ
s
m > γm ≥ 0 implies
Usm(1) ≥ 0. Hence γ
s is the upper bound to M ’s equilibrium utility.
Part (i): For c < σ, γbn = 1 is reached as a unique equilibrium both under
bi and under d; consequently, the two systems are equivalent. For c > 1 + σ,
all systems are characterised by zero education and thus are equivalent.
Part (ii), σ < c < 1 + σ: For pm > c − σ, γbn = 1 is reached as a unique
equilibrium under bi. For pm < c − σ, γmun = 1 and zero education in both
groups are the two stable unilingual equilibria. In order for a competing system
to outperform uni, it must have γ˜mun +γ˜
b
n = 1 in every equilibrium for pm < c−σ.
However, any education system necessarily has γ˜n = 0 as a (stable) equilibrium
in this interval (see the preceding proof).
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B.5. Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the arbitrary equilibria γd, γuni, and γbi. Manipulating terms yields
udn(γ
d) − ubin (γ
bi) = (γdn − γ
bi
n )U
d
n(γ
d
m) + pmγ
d
m(1 − γ
bi
n ) ≥ 0 and u
bi
n (γ
bi) −
uunin (γ
uni) = (γbin − γ
uni
n )U
bi
n (γ
bi) + pnγ
uni
n (1− γ
uni
n )(2 + σ) ≥ 0, which imply
that udn(γ
d) ≥ ubin (γ
bi) ≥ uunin (γ
uni) for all γd,γuni, and γbi.
Appendix C. Extensions
For a native Lish speaker, the expected utility from attending a bilingual school,
a unilingual Lish school, and a unilingual school in the other language (−L)
are given as follows:
U b = −c− κ+ (1 + fm + fn)(1 + σ);
U lul (µ) = −c+ [pl(1− (1− α)µ
−lu
l ) + p−l(µ
b
−l + µ
lu
−l) + fl](1 + σ);
U−lu
l
(µ) = −c+ α(1 + fm + fn)(1 + σ)
+(1− α)[pl(µ
b
l + µ
−lu
l
) + p−l(1− (1− α)µ
lu
−l) + f−l](1 + σ).
For this individual, the utility of not taking education is
U l(µ) = pl(1− (1− α)µ
−lu
l
) + p−l(µ
b
−l + µ
lu
−l) + fl.
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